Review: Aufheben magazine

I've heard quite a bit about Aufheben, the British magazine which can best be described as one of the more prominent libertarian communist publications. If you are unfamiliar with libertarian communism, it could best be described as a contemporary movement of political thought and practice that fuses Marxism, anti-authoritarianism with other contemporary theories. Libertarian communism is becoming more popular in Europe and in other parts of the world. Aufheben is widely cited by those interested in these new political currents.

Review: Aufheben magazine

Aufheben #15

2007. Brighton & Hove Unemployed Centre. PO Box 2536. Rottingdean, Brighton BN2 6LX. UK. Aufheben99@yahoo.co.uk. www.geocities.com/aufheben2

Reviewed by Chuck Munson

I've heard quite a bit about Aufheben, the British magazine which can best be described as one of the more prominent libertarian communist publications. If you are unfamiliar with libertarian communism, it could best be described as a contemporary movement of political thought and practice that fuses Marxism, anti-authoritarianism with other contemporary theories. Libertarian communism is becoming more popular in Europe and in other parts of the world. Aufheben is widely cited by those interested in these new political currents.

Aufheben is not the most attractive of contemporary political magazines, but it packs quite a bit of analysis into its 54 pages. This issues features two main articles and a long review. And that's it. But Aufheben makes up for its lack of flash with plenty of substance.

This issue starts off with an analysis of the Middle East political situation titled “Lebanon,, Iran and the 'Long War' in the 'Wider Middle East'.” Aufheben takes the view in this article that a war between the U.S. and Iran is unlikely. This analysis is all the more striking because it was probably penned in late 2006 and as of late 2007 no war has occurred between the U.S. and Iran.

The anti-war left in the U.K. (and in the U.S.) has latched onto the tensions between the U.S. and Iran as a new rallying cry for the anti-war movement. In the U.K., the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) pumped up the Iran crisis through the Stop the War Coalition. They attempted to build alliances with political Islamic groups and were quickly rejected by these groups. The focus on Iran as the next stage in the U.S. war on the region was in part a response by the SWP to their failure to gain electoral power through recent electoral campaigns. This hopping around from target to target is similar to how left-wing political groups operate in the United States. American leftist-run anti-war groups are now trying to drum up rally numbers with talk about a war with Iran which is unlikely to happen. Aufheben is also appropriately cynical about the SWP's effectiveness as leaders of the U.K. Wing of the anti-war movements.

“As we pointed out at the time, during the run up to the invasion of Iraq in 2002 the StWC (Stop the War Coalition) had been merely one element in a broad and multifaceted anti-war movement. Its main function had been to organise national demonstrations and in doing so reflect the lowest common denominator of the anti-war movement—a function it must be conceded it did quite ably. The sheer size and enthusiasm of the anti-war movement meant that the ability of the StWC to corral it in any particular direction had been limited. However, in the past three years the movement has subsided and become dissipated. Now, as many local groups have shrunk to a hardcore of activists a large proportion of which being SWP/Respect members, the StWC is in a much stronger position to dictate the politics and activity of a much smaller anti-war movement. A position that the SWP has sought to exploit to the full.”

Much has been said about the 2003 invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq as being a “war for oil.” This has been one of the most popular slogans used by the international anti-war movement, but how is this war about oil? It certainly hasn't lowered the price of oil, as the price per barrel went above $90 this week. Aufheben explains the war for oil as being part of the U.S.'s longer term geopolitical goals. In the ideology of the American neocons, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are part of the “Long War” that will project American power into the region and protect American business interests. The “Long War” is conceived as a multi-decade successor to the Cold War.

There was a time when U.S. corporations controlled most of the world's oil supply, but now much of the remaining and potential oil reserves are controlled by national companies and non-US corporations. What worries the elite planners of the U.S., and especially the neocons, is that much of the world's oil supply is located in the Middle East and Central Asia. The U.S. is also worried about China's growing economy and its desire for more cheap energy.

The prevailing foreign policy philosophy prior to Bush 2 was to maintain the political status quo among oil rich countries. At the same time, the U.S. had been jockeying for power in the region for many decades. With the demise of the Soviet Union, the U.S. started asserting itself more directly and forcefully in the Middle East, Europe, and Asia. The U.S. also started demonizing Iraq and Iran, in part to force sanctions that aided in controlling the oil supply. U.S. policies were criticized by the neocons for being too cautious in asserting the powers and interest of the “last remaining superpower.” The military was seen as still being overly cautious because of Vietnam. The Project for New American Century brought together most of these neocons and set the agenda for the foreign policy later implemented by Bush Jr. The neocons had concluded that the U.S. had to organize and assert hegemony over the region in order to control the oil market over the long term.

The September 11th attacks gave Bush Jr. and his neo-conservative regime the excuse it needed to start asserting U.S. power over the Middle East and Central Asia. The invasion of Afghanistan provided the opportunity to set up military power on Russia's southern doorstep. It also positioned the U.S. on one side of Iran, which the neocons saw as the third phase of their strategy. The U.S. “won” the subsequent invasion of Iraq, but has basically lost the war that followed. It's hard to believe that neocon themselves believed that the Iraqi people would rise up to greet the Americans as liberators. After all, the U.S. had supported Saddam Hussein, had bombed and invaded Iraq in 1991, and had killed over a million Iraqis through sanctions during the Clinton administration. Aufheben goes on to point out that the U.S. then failed in three key areas which inflamed Iraqis even more against the occupation. There was no significant civil opposition left, especially of the leftist variety. Islamic clerics and militias moved into the political vacuum created by the American effort to set up a secular, pro-U.S. puppet regime. The U.S. also disbanded the existing government bureaucracy and the army, throwing thousands of Iraqis out of work. Lastly, the U.S. reconstruction effort totally failed, except when it came to lining the pockets of American companies..

The article continues with an overview of U.S. intervention in the recent “revolutions” in the Ukraine, Georgia, and Lebanon. These interventions helped bring about successes like the “Orange Revolution,” but subsequent developments created a murkier outcome for the people affected by those revolutions. U.S. intervention may have even backfired in the long run, as Russia, China and the former Soviet republics are organizing together to counter U.S. power in the region.

While the Iranian government has been demonized as a member of the “Axis of Evil,” Iran has been a hotbed of class struggle, with many strikes and demonstrations being staged in recent years by miners, transit workers, students, factory workers, farmers, and more. This growing struggle has provoked a violent response from the Iranian “neo-conservative” Ahmadinejad government, which works hand in hand with the conservative religious authorities. The various labor movements in Iran have shown tremendous cooperation in the face of increasing government repression. Aufheben points out that the growing labor movement is partly a response to neoliberal policies that have been pursued by Iran going back to the late 1980s. The Ahmadinejad government has even tried to improve relations with the U.S. in order to lure American corporations into Iran where they can exploit an increasingly casualized workforce.

While the left has been preoccupied with the Iraq occupation and the situation between the U.S. and Iran, an actual shooting war broke out in 2006 between Israel and Lebanon, which may have shed more light on what the U.S. actually aims to do in the region. The August 2006 conflict has been cast as a proxy war between the U.S. and Iran, with Israel supposedly acting on behalf of the U.S. and Hizballah representing Iran. Some analysts on the left have argued that the U.S. and Israel were organizing a prelude to an attack on Iran. Aufheben makes a good case that Israel initiated the war for internal security and political reasons. Israel was concerned over rockets that had been moved into southern Lebanon and then there was the ostensible reason for the war: the kidnapping of three Israeli soldiers. If the U.S. and Israeli intended to send a message to Iran, they failed, as Israel lost the war in a spectacular fashion.

The second article, titled “Theoretical criticism and practical overthrow fifteen years on: a reflection,” looks at the magazine's history and relates it to an outline of different levels of theoretical work versus activism. The tendency of activists to fetishize their practice is criticized. The ideological activist represents one end of the spectrum whereas the activist ideologue represents the other end. Activist ideologues aren't that interested in everyday activism, but are more interested in coming up with the “correct” ideas. The academics are mostly restrained by the nature of their role within universities. Their analysis is often timid and the intellectual debates within their milieu are typically apolitical. The theorist is more engaged with activism, but prefers a focus on theory. Everything revolves around theory for the theorist.

This article proceeds to talk about these types in the context of several real world campaigns, including the Job Seeker's Allowance campaign of 1995-1997 and the anti-war campaigns of 2002-2003. In 2002, several different kinds of anti-war groups in Brighton (UK) coalesced to pull off an illegal and rowdy Halloween anti-war protest. This protest was remarkable in that direct action and reformist liberal groups came together for a protest that most participants later characterized as being very empowering, Direct action groups participated in a more traditional mass protest and reformist groups didn't make their usual effort to get permission from the police. Even some members of the SWP got caught up in the successful protests and refused orders from the national SWP to focus on recuperating the local groups into the Stop the War Coalition. This section goes on to explain how the activist theorist types missed the grassroots build up to the Halloween protests:

“Yet, this development was missed by theoreticists and unrecognized by activist ideologues. Many theoreticists refused to 'mix' themselves up with non-revolutionary participants and missed the build up to the street protests, and the street protests themselves. Many activist ideologues participated in SafP and at demonstrations as critical observers, standing in the sidelines, except for criticizing the words of some leaflets or, in some cases, producing some sterile critique.”

For the activist intellectual, this particular article is useful in that it outlines the roles that radicals tend to fall into as either activists or intellectuals. In reality, radicals tend to move around these categories and often exhibit facets of each type. Radicals tend to gravitate towards behavior and practice that both reflects their personality and their skills vis a vis social change movements. Some radicals prefer to focus on activism, either because this is what they are interested in and/or because they have practical skills that lend themselves to a focus on activism. Other radicals prefer to focus on writing, theorizing, discussing, publishing and meeting at conferences. None of these roles is necessarily more important than the other, but there has been a long-standing antagonism among activists (at least in Western movements) over questions of theory versus practice.

The issues wraps up with a review of Moishe Postone's 1993 book “Time, labour and social domination.” As book reviews go, this is one of the longer ones I've ever run across at 21 pages. The reviewer looks at Postone's theories about Marx.